Levelling Down by Wolff, Jonathan
1Levelling Down 










Egalitarians were once often accused of wishing to ‘level down’; bringing everyone 
down to a lower level if this is the only way to secure equality. In the light of work 
by Rawls and Parfit it is possible to construct recognisably egalitarian theories which 
avoid levelling down. However in this paper it is argued that in some special cases it 
is right to level down, even if this does not improve the situation of the worst. These 
are cases where inequality has a certain symbolic function or meaning.
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3Levelling Down
Egalitarianism, we were once told, is the 'politics of envy'. It is better, so egalitarians 
were alleged to believe, to make everyone equal than to allow inequalities, even if 
some or all would be better off. Thus egalitarians were said to favour 'levelling 
down' jealously refusing to allow, or even undoing, Pareto improvements over 
equality: improvements that made at least one person better off without making 
anyone else worse off. In the worst case, it is said, egalitarians will recommend 
dragging everyone down to the same level, even if everyone is worse off than they 
would have been in an unequal society.
This accusation now seems rather dated. Post Rawls (1971), Frankfurt (1987) 
and Parfit (1998) most of those who call themselves egalitarians would say that they 
too would oppose levelling down, all things considered, preferring some form of 
sufficiency or prioritarian position. Some theorists put things this way: although 
justice requires equality, considerations of Pareto efficiency always trump 
considerations of justice. Others set out their view another way: the Pareto principle 
is itself a principle of justice, and so levelling down can never be required by justice.
I wonder, though, whether it is time to re-examine this knee-jerk antipathy to 
levelling down. Can it never be right to level down? In the abstract levelling down 
sounds mean-spirited, or wasteful, or both, but when we look at examples need this 
always be the case? This is my question here.
41. The 'Real-Pareto' Maxim
We should note, from the outset, that if a theorist favours some redistribution, then 
some forms of levelling down, in some circumstances, may be inevitable. To explain, 
once we have chosen our 'currency' of justice, legitimate redistribution in that 
currency may require levelling down in some other currency. Suppose, for example, 
we want to maximise the preference satisfaction of the worst off. Doing this may 
require us to move to a form of society in which everyone, including the worst off, 
has fewer material resources. For example the worst off may now get better use of , 
and thus more preference satisfaction from, their smaller bundle of resources because 
of reduced over-crowding effects. Preferring a lower total stock of material goods 
may in one way seem inefficient or wasteful but this is irrelevant. The point to note is 
that a change that is Pareto efficient in terms of one currency may very commonly be 
Pareto inefficient in terms of another. Once this point is recognised we see that the 
accusation that a proposal will be Pareto inefficient may, in itself, be a very weak 
objection; it all depends on its efficiency in the correct currency.
Few, I think, will have reason to object to anything I have said so far. But 
many will be strongly attracted to the following line of thought: although levelling 
down in 'irrelevant' currencies is sometimes acceptable, levelling down in the correct 
currency never is. Once we know what the real currency of justice is, there is never a 
sufficient reason for levelling down. Call this the real-Pareto maxim.
5Is the real-Pareto maxim correct? Its attraction is based, I think, on a type of 
moral individualism. The guiding thought is that the only things in the world that 
are good or bad are good or bad for particular or individual human beings (or other 
members of the moral community). Consequently to show that something is bad one 
must show that it is bad for a given individual. If we cannot point to an individual 
who is worse off under situation x than they would be under situation y then x 
cannot be worse than y.1 If you agree with this apparently appealing thought then 
you accept the real-Pareto maxim.
Is Pareto-efficiency required by justice or by efficiency? A view associated 
with Cohen (Cohen 1989, p. 911) is that properly speaking, justice requires strict 
equality (equal access to advantage) but where justice leads to Pareto inefficiency, it 
is wrong to insist on justice. So on a strong statement of this view, there are two 
values in play - - justice and efficiency - - and efficiency (at least real-Pareto 
efficiency) trumps justice. The socially best outcome may, in some respects, be unjust. 
The alternative view is that the Pareto efficiency is a principle of justice, and so there 
is no outweighing of different values; just a more complex view of justice.
                                                
1  I am aware that this principle loses its grip in respect of policy choices that 
affect the make up of future populations. (See Parfit 1984, part 4, for the classic 
discussion.) Here I ignore such cases.
6This alternative view, I have been persuaded,2 is highly implausible, at least if 
taken in its full generality. Suppose that by whatever is our preferred currency we 
have achieved equality. Suppose now that by some economic freak we have two 
choices: we can either stay as we are, or we can rearrange things so that one 
particular person, Harry, now has ten times as much as anyone else, although no-one 
else's share has changed, even in the correct currency. If we refuse to permit this 
change we might be accused of being mean-spirited, wasteful or narrow-minded, but 
it does not ring true to say that we have been unjust to Harry (assuming, of course, 
he has no other special claim for the resources), except perhaps in the most extended 
sense of justice, where to act unjustly is simply to do something wrong. 
Now if this example is accepted it does not show that Pareto-improvements 
are never required by justice. All it shows is that some Pareto-improvements are not 
required by justice. Thus this on its own does not establish that the real-Pareto 
maxim is purely a maxim of efficiency. However I think we have this much: if we 
wish to insist that levelling down in the correct currency is always wrong, then we 
have conceded that in a certain range of cases, however small, requirements of 
efficiency trump requirements of justice where they conflict. But should we accept 
this?
The view we are considering, then, is that where we can make at least one 
person better off in the relevant sense without making anyone worse off in that sense 
                                                
2 By Michael Otsuka, to whom I owe the following example.
7then we should always do so. As we have seen, in broad terms the explanation for 
this is that in a given range of cases efficiency always trumps equality. However, it is 
worth noting that the explanation can be elaborated  - -  i.e. the relevant range of 
cases can be specified - - in importantly different ways:
a) The absolute view: efficiency always trumps equality in cases where 
efficiency gains for some do not lead to losses for anyone. (These are the real-
Pareto cases.) However we must never let the position of the worst-off fall.
b) The relative view: efficiency always trumps equality in the real-Pareto 
cases. However we can also allow losses, even to the worst off, if the losses are 
relatively slight when compared to the gains that can be made elsewhere. (The 
small-loss/great gain cases.)
The absolute view, then, says that the only efficiency gains that are justifiable 
are Pareto improvements. The relative view - - one version of which is Parfit's 
prioritarianism - - adds that some utility gains are also acceptable, even if they are 
not Pareto improvements. 
Although the relative view might be defended on intuitive grounds, it does 
seem that there are also theoretical reasons that make the absolute view the harder to
defend. The absolute view appears to make at least two assumptions:
8a) Justice is so important that we should never make the worst off even worse 
off (however trivially) for the sake of others.3
b) Efficiency is so important that whenever we have the chance we should 
make someone better off, provided it does not make anyone (or at least the 
worst off) worse off.
In other words, in one range of cases justice trumps efficiency (when the efficiency 
gains are partly at the expense of the worst off), in another range of cases efficiency 
trumps justice (when the efficiency gains are not at the expense of the worst off). 
Now there is a certain mathematical elegance about this, and I would not claim that 
there is any inconsistency  in holding this combination of views. The difficulty is at a 
different level. What plausible argument could justify this combination? What good 
reason can be given for allowing the trumping to 'switch' on a hair-trigger in this 
way? Consider again the case of Harry. We are required to  make him ten times 
better off than others, provided no-one else is thereby made worse off. But if a single 
person loses a fraction of a percent of what they already  have then this change 
becomes impermissible. Now there is no difficulty is showing that the combination 
of theses set out above has this consequence. The difficulty is explaining what reason 
there can be for holding the combination of theses that gives such importance to such 
                                                
3  Some will say that justice allows the worst off to become worse off still when it 
is their own fault. I want to ignore that complication in what follows as it does 
not affect the substance of the argument.
9a boundary. Why should we pay such overwhelming attention to the actual current 
level of the worst off?
Thus we can see the relative view as tacitly responding to this line of 
rhetorical questioning. Once the importance of efficiency is acknowledged, the claim 
that there is any range of cases where justice trumps efficiency is dropped. Now it is 
important not to misunderstand this: we need to be clear about the distinction 
between 'trumping' and 'beating'. As I understand the distinction, value  x trumps 
value y iff in any case of conflict value x always beats value y, and, on a case by case 
basis, no further justification need be given to explain why. In cases of ordinary 
beating, one value beats another because in that particular case the combination of 
the weight and extent of one value is greater than the combination of the weight and 
extent of another. In such cases we have to go through the argument and comparison 
before we can reach a resolution. In trumping cases such a procedure is unnecessary. 
In consequence, to say that justice never trumps efficiency does not entail that 
efficiency always wins. In fact it is consistent with the outcome that in the cases 
under consideration efficiency never wins. The point is that we need to look at the 
details of each case to come to a resolution. Thus on the relative view, there is a range 
of case where justice generally wins. But there is no range where justice trumps 
efficiency.
The absolute view, as we have seen, assumes that there is a range of cases 
where efficiency trumps justice, and another range of cases where justice trumps 
efficiency. This leads to what I called hair-trigger switching of trumping, which 
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seems hard to justify. So in apparent recognition of this difficulty the relative view 
abandons the claim that there is a range of cases where justice trumps efficiency. 
However we now have something else in need of explanation: why was that the correct 
abandonment? Why not, instead, abandon the claim that efficiency trumps justice? Or, 
as I would prefer, why not give up both claims, and thus look at the issues on a case 
by case basis?
Diagnostically, we might suggest that those who assert the real-Pareto maxim, 
including holders of the relative view, have been so concerned about the levelling 
down objection that they have wanted to set out a view where levelling down is, in 
principle, never acceptable.4 This seems to me an over-reaction. Suppose we could 
come up with a view in which levelling down was acceptable only in certain very 
special cases, and, in such cases we can be clear that first, the circumstances do 
indeed justify levelling down, and second, they are sufficiently special that there is 
no reason to believe that this reasoning will spread to other types of cases. Wouldn't 
that be a sufficient reply to the levelling-down objection?
The most likely response to this alternative proposal is that we simply will not 
find any such cases. If so, first, even those of egalitarian sympathies can agree with 
                                                
4 Thus I would say that this is a case where the development of an egalitarian 
position has been hampered by taking too much notice of right-wing criticism. 
For another example see Wolff 1998.
11
their critics that levelling down is never justified, and, second, it may be that the best 
explanation of such a generalisation is that (real-Pareto) efficiency trumps justice.
The only way of settling this is to look at some apparent cases of levelling 
down. But first it is worth recalling a point made early on in this paper. Whether or 
not a change is a Pareto-improvement is always relative to currency. Therefore what 
may be a levelling down in one currency may be a Pareto improvement in another. 
From this it follows that from a given example in which there appears to be a 
levelling down we cannot conclude that it is a genuine case. For when the right 
currency is specified it might turn out that no levelling down was involved after all.
Indeed this makes the discussion methodologically complex. Suppose I 
present an example in which it looks as if levelling down is legitimate. We might take 
this as proving my case that efficiency does not trump equality. But we could just as 
easily take it to show that we have not yet put our finger on the correct currency of 
justice. Thus there are two ways of taking any apparent example of levelling down: 
first, as a counter-example to the real-Pareto maxim; second, as evidence that we still 
have not yet achieved clarity on the question of the currency of justice.
Some will feel that there is something ad hoc, perhaps question begging, 
about the second strategy. After all, it will render the real-Pareto maxim close to true 
by definition, or at least treat it as having axiomatic status. Cutting off debate in this 
way seems both unphilosophical and premature. But in response, it seems that no 
one has yet provided a definitive statement of the ultimate currency of justice -
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(hereafter 'real well-being' which I shall simply use as a placeholder5) - - and so we 
need any help we can get. If a discussion of apparent levelling down can yield 
insight into the nature of real well-being that is a valuable enough result in itself. If 
the price of this is to treat the real-Pareto maxim as an axiom, that need not be too 
high to pay. The methodology, then, would be to continually refine our 
understanding of real well-being until apparent counter examples to the real-Pareto 
maxim disappear.
And, in indeed, this strategy is far from risk free. For there are other 
constraints on an acceptable account of real well-being, and the question then would 
be whether they can consistently be met together with the real-Pareto constraint. In 
particular the following two seem plausible:
a) It must be finitely statable.
b) It must be such that it is possible to provide at least a partial order of well-
being so that we can identify the worst off.
If, after all our efforts, we cannot come up with an account of real well-being 
which satisfies these constraints and can be made consistent with our intuitions 
about apparently acceptable levelling down, then the most plausible strategy must 
be to give up this approach, and to admit that the real-Pareto maxim should be 
                                                
5 Thus I do not intend to beg the question against those who believe that the 
correct currency is to be formulated in terms of primary goods, or resources or 
advantage or basic capabilities or anything else.
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abandoned. But we are, of course, a long way from that point yet, and we will not 
conclusively reach it in this paper, for I will not attempt to state an account of real-
well being that satisfies the real-Pareto maxim. But I will attempt to identify some 
difficulties that stand in the way.
2. Richard Norman on Social Equality
Let us begin our study of cases by considering the following argument from Richard 
Norman, who, like me, suspects that the levelling down objection has been over-
played. Norman argues for what he calls Socially-Located Egalitarianism (SE) which 
he defines thus:
Equality is a socially-located value, a conception of social justice i.e. 
egalitarians should object to inequalities of well-being between people in the 
same community. (Norman 1998, p. 38)
It is worth quoting the argument at length:
We can imagine circumstances in which, from the standpoint of SE, equality at 
a lower level of well-being might be seen as preferable to inequality at a 
higher level of well-being for everyone. Imagine an egalitarian community at 
a fairly low level of economic development whose members, though not 
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experiencing great hardship or absolute poverty, have a simple life style. 
Given the opportunity of economic development which would make them all 
better off but introduce substantial inequalities, they might prefer to remain 
less prosperous but equal. I am not thinking here of the typical attendant evils 
of industrialisation such as crime and social conflict and environmental 
pollution which would enable us to explain their choice  by saying that they 
would not really be better off. I am supposing that they would acknowledge 
that they would be better off with economic development, but they still prefer 
equality. It is not, as it might appear ..., a crazed obsession with uniformity 
and symmetry and neatness. It is a preference for certain kinds of social 
relations. They may fear that, with greater inequality, they will become more 
distanced from one another, their society will become less co-operative, the 
more prosperous among them will become disdainful and supercilious and 
the less prosperous will become either more servile or more resentful, and 
they will no longer be united by shared experience and a shared condition. 
(Norman 1998, p. 51)
This initially plausible account of apparently justified levelling down allows 
us to bring out several issues. First, it is worth noting that Norman is clearly aware of 
a point mentioned above: levelling down may be more apparent than real. If 
inequality brought crime and pollution, perhaps this would make the worst off 
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worse off still. They could, then, object to the inequality on the grounds that it makes 
them worse off. This could not be construed as 'real levelling down', a violation of 
the real-Pareto maxim. To avoid this response, Norman stipulates that the example 
involves no such loss.
Nevertheless, his opponents will claim that Norman has not done enough to 
register the importance of this kind of point. We must note that several ways of 
assessing levels of well-being seem implicit here. Economic development makes 
everyone better off, it is said. Certainly there will be improvements in standard of 
living: cars and washing machines replace bicycles and hard, unfulfilling, toil. In 
material terms, then, inequality improves the lot of everyone: they have more 
resources and their standard of living is higher. Nevertheless, SE is defined in terms 
of well-being, not material resources or standard of living. That there may be 
occasions where we must level down in material resources in order to boost the well-
being of the worst off is only to be expected. Arguably it might also be the case that 
we may need to level down in terms of standard of living in order to increase the 
well-being of the worst off: a car may be insufficient consolation for alienation from 
one's fellow human beings.
Clearly Norman thinks his example is a significant one, and introduces it as 
one where the equal society involves a lower level of well-being for everyone. 
Nevertheless the people 'prefer to remain less prosperous but equal'. There are 
various complexities here. First the language has shifted somewhat. Is 'prosperity' a 
welfare term, a standard of living term or material resources term? If either of the 
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latter two, then, once more the real-Pareto maxim is not challenged. So we must read 
'less prosperous' as 'having a lower level of well-being'. But now we must ask, who 
prefers this? We are told that 'they' do, where this is most naturally read as whoever 
it is who is empowered to speak for the society as a whole. Should we then read this 
as 'everyone'? Certainly as we read on, we can be persuaded that neither future-rich 
or future-poor could much like the prospect of anticipating what they might become: 
who wants to become disdainful and supercilious or servile and resentful? But here 
the same strategy of defence bites again: the real-Pareto theorist will say that what 
we are agreeing to when we agree with Norman is that these gains in well-being 
from equality are more apparent than real. When we weigh an easier life but distant 
social relations against honest toil in equality we realise we are better off as we are. 
So, the real-Pareto theorist will argue, there is no levelling down after all. We stick 
with equality for fear of making people worse off in what really counts. In 
conclusion, then, this example does not show that real levelling down can be 
acceptable. Can a more convincing illustration be found?
3. Race and the Swimming Pool
You are the mayor of a small town in the Southern States of the US. Your town has a 
swimming pool which is open to all. Against your opposition, your State Senate 
passes a new law: swimming pools must be racially segregated. If there is only one 
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pool, then it must be made available to whites only. As mayor, you do not have 
funds to build another swimming pool, but in any case object to racial segregation. 
However if you try to disobey the new law, you will be removed from office, and 
replaced with a State official. But rather than allowing a whites only swimming pool 
you decide to shut it down completely. Your opponents then accuse you of levelling 
down.
So two related questions arise. First, is this really a case of levelling down in 
any interesting sense? Second, if so, is it justified? But let me be dogmatic. I will 
assume in this case that it is justified. So if it is a case of levelling down it is a case of 
justified levelling down.
There are some fairly obvious things that can be said, immediately, to make it 
appear that, although this is a levelling down in short-term access to swimming 
pools, it is not a real levelling down, that is, a violation of the real-Pareto maxim. 
Presumably the most promising way of making out such a case would be to argue 
that there is a sense in which blacks are better off with the swimming pool closed 
than open only to whites. And no doubt there are ways of expanding on the details 
to make this clearly so. The opposing view is that at least on one expansion of the 
case things are better (the state of affairs is better justified) with the swimming pool closed 




It could be suggested that this policy is not so much a case of levelling down as an 
attempt to put pressure on the authorities - the State - to repeal their new law. If the 
State wants to improve conditions for whites, and sees that this is now tied together 
with improved conditions for blacks, then they may have no alternative to repeal the 
law. However it is perfectly possible that this is simply the latest move in an 
incremental policy of State racism, and no such tactics, when attempted in the past, 
have paid off. Thus as Mayor you have no reason to believe that the authorities will 
be swayed to any degree by anything you do.
b) Reinforcement of inequality
In some cases a policy of segregation or exclusion can have accumulating effects. 
Consider a debate that sometimes takes place about whether a golf club can properly 
exclude Jews, or blacks, or women. Sometimes it is said that a private club can set its 
own rules: if people want to mix only with a certain type of person than this is up to 
them. Many replies to this are often made, but one prominent response is that a golf 
club, typically, is not simply a place where people go to play golf, but also to make 
social and business contacts. Thus anyone who is a member of the club is further 
advantaged by access to a level of opportunity that is not readily available to non-
members. So non-members may see their well-being decline both relative to the 
members and in absolute terms as the members consolidate their social and business 
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advantages. In this way, then, non members are not only excluded from golf but lose 
further in life's competitive struggle. Consequently closing the golf club would make 
non members better off in at least one significant respect.
In general this is an important argument. But we can, I think, stipulate that it 
does not apply to the case of the swimming pool. At the swimming pool people just 
swim. No deals are struck, there is no bar or cafe in which people enjoy a rich social 
life and consequent opportunities. So these longer-term accumulating effects simply 
do not apply. There is no reason to believe that this non-competitive inequality will 
lead to a competitive inequality - - an inequality in a fixed supply of goods - - in 
which those who do badly are thereby made worse off than they would be under 
conditions of equality.
c) Moral virtue and solidarity
Suppose that the white users of the pool were extremely sympathetic to the plight of 
the blacks, and felt that if the blacks were excluded they, the whites, would not want 
to use the pool anyway to show solidarity, or at least to avoid the moral taint of 
taking advantage of an unfair situation. Hence in one sense closing the swimming 
pool does not harm anyone. The whites would feel better if it were closed, and are 
better off in terms of what really counts - - virtue - - and the blacks are better off for 
this expression of solidarity. On this reading closing the pool is very far from an 
example of levelling down: indeed it may be a strong Pareto-improvement!
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In reply it can be conceded that we can imagine such preferences, but that the 
case for closing the swimming pool is not premised upon them. Consider the case 
where the whites greatly resent the closing of the pool, and set up a protest against it. 
The blacks do not benefit from increased solidarity because none is shown. If, even in 
this case, it is justified to close the swimming pool, then considerations of virtue and 
solidarity are not the prime justifying factor.
d) Fairness as well-being
Nevertheless, it may be replied that even if the whites do not show solidarity, there is 
still at least one sense on which the blacks are better off for the closing of the pool. 
For that situation is fair and the previous situation was unfair. Being treated unfairly 
is a way of being made worse off.
This is a claim, though, that can come in importantly different versions, and of 
different degrees of plausibility, and it is necessary to make some distinctions. 
Consider the following claims:
a) The fact that a situation is unfair to you makes you worse off.
b) The fact that you correctly believe a situation to be unfair to you makes you 
worse off.
c) The fact that you believe a situation (whether correctly or incorrectly) to be 
unfair to you makes you worse off.
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d) A combination of your belief that a situation is unfair to you, and your 
feeling resentment or envy or anger at this unfairness, makes you worse off.
e) Envy or resentment of others who have more, even though this is not 
believed to be unfair, makes you worse off.
Let us take these in order. As to the first, although the claim has some plausibility 
there seem to be theoretical reasons to avoid it. For it is natural to think that the 
fairness of a situation is at least partly determined by the well-being of the people in 
that situation. If, then, the fairness of the situation partly determines well-being 
levels then, for many cases, indeterminacy threatens. So for reasons of conceptual 
clarity it is sensible to deny (a), which means devising a measure of well-being which 
does not allow that the mere fact that a situation is unfair to you makes you worse 
off. 
It might be thought, though, that when we add the correct belief that the 
situation is unfair the case for claiming that there is an impact on well-being becomes 
stronger. For here we have something undeniably internal to the agent. Yet in reply, 
it should be said that if the belief is correct then taking it into account is a type of 
double-counting: unfairness must already be taken into account, and so what does 
the belief in unfairness add? If the belief is incorrect it seems quite bizarre to take it 
into account at all. (cf Dworkin 1981, pp. 198-201) And aside from moral concerns, 
indeterminacy threatens again.
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This may not seem enough to head off this challenge. After all, a belief that a 
situation is unfair to you, whether a correct belief or not, can eat away at your life 
and generate misery of the most literal sort. However, if this is true we have moved 
to a different claim: the source of the well-being loss is the belief plus the further 
effect this belief has on one's mental life. So we should now consider the fourth claim 
above, having dismissed the first three. 
On a natural theory of well-being, suffering from envy and resentment are 
clear forms of lack of well-being. Thus a theory of well-being that excludes them is 
must be theoretically, rather than analytically, motivated in that respect.6 But before 
continuing with this line of thought it is worth reminding ourselves of the place in 
the argument.
The question we are addressing is that of whether closing the swimming pool 
makes the blacks better off. The immediate version of this question is whether 
closing it makes them better off in the following respect: it turns an unfair situation 
into a fair one. I have argued that this is not a way of making people better off, and 
thus this is not a way of avoiding describing the situation as one of levelling down. 
We now have a different suggestion: closing the swimming pool reduces the anger or 
                                                
6 I should acknowledge that those who argue that the current currency is 
resource-based, to the exclusion of well-being, have no reason to pursue this 
issue, at least in these terms. Thus the following paragraphs should concern only 
those who believe that well-being is at least part of the currency of justice.
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resentment or envy felt by the blacks, and thus makes them better off in one respect. 
For this reason, once more, we need not describe the case as levelling down.
For the purposes of my main argument, however, we can remain agnostic on 
the question of whether envy affects well-being. For it seems to me that the case for 
closing down the swimming pool is not premised on the blacks having a feeling of 
these or any other sort. Although there could be cases where the blacks are envious 
of the whites this need not be the case. If this is conceded and it is still conceded that 
the swimming pool should still be shut, even if the blacks do not care whether it is shut,
then we still have a case of apparent levelling down. Further investigation is 
necessary.
However although not strictly necessary to the argument, the question of 
whether envy or similar emotions can affect well-being in our theoretically pure 
sense of well-being is undeniably an interesting question and worth pursuing. Here 
the consensus view seems to be that it is not a relevant determinant: Rawls (Rawls 
1971  pp. 530-41) and Nozick (1974, p. 162) both suggest that arguments from envy 
have no place in the theory of justice. However, given that such feelings can cripple a 
life it seems harsh to judge that they should simply be ignored.
It seems to me that the idea that envy should not be taken into account may be 
based on the following argument:
a) If we were to take envy into account as a determinant of well-being we would 
have to compensate those who were envious.
b) To compensate those who are envious means taxing the non-envious.
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c) It is highly counter-intuitive and morally unattractive to redistribute from the non-
envious to the envious just in virtue of that difference.
Therefore:
d) Envy should not be considered a determinant of well-being.
Now it would be possible to contest (c), but I will not consider that. Rather, I 
think (a) requires examination. It is based on what could be called the 'compensation' 
paradigm: that if there is injustice then compensation of some sort should be made. 
This goes hand in hand with what we might think of as the 'thermometer' model of 
well-being: that one can model well-being as one does temperature, and if it falls 
then it should be restored to previous levels by the simplest and easiest method: 
normally a compensating cash payment. But well-being may be a highly complex 
notion, and compensation can be quite inappropriate in some cases. To take the case 
of envy, if A is envious of B, and one think this an undesirable situation, then there 
seem to be at least four ways of remedy:
a) Compensate A.
b) Remove from B whatever it is that is the cause of the envy. (Levelling resources is 
one example of this, although if envy is a determinant of well-being this would not 
be real-levelling down.)
c) Induce false beliefs in A so that A no longer has the beliefs that gave rise to the 
envy. (For a real example of this, see Wolff 1991, p. 125.)
d) Induce character changes in A so that A is no longer an envious person.
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Once this is spelled out it seems to me that we should acknowledge that envy 
can be detrimental to well-being, but it should not be assumed to be in the same 
category of well-being loss, to, say, hunger or lack of shelter. It may not call for 
compensation, but it may call for remedy of the fourth type, and there may be 
reasons to tax everyone - - envious and non-envious alike - - to try to establish 'envy 
clinics' for the most serious cases, just as there are clinics for other character 
disorders. But if these fail it does not follow that there is a case for any compensation 
and still less for complete levelling down.
It follows from this that any mere fact that the blacks are envious of the 
swimming opportunities of the whites is in itself no reason for closing the swimming 
pool. But in any case, as I have suggested, the intuitive plausibility of the case for 
closing the pool does not rest on considerations about envy.
e) Symbolic value
Some may have been uncomfortable with my use if the categories 'blacks' and 
'whites' in discussing this case, and would have preferred that I used the niceties 
often followed in such discussions, describing the groups as the blues and the greens 
or the bigfeet and the smallfeet. But the examples do not work so well as fiction: it is 
vital, I think, to the discussion that there is an implied history and background.
To explain, let me contrast this with a different case. Suppose the State edict 
was not that blacks should be excluded, but that people with red hair should be 
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banned, on health grounds. Perhaps the situation is that it has been discovered that 
red hair contains a chemical which reacts with water to induce sickness in those who 
do not have red hair. (Ignore the question of why this has only been found out now.) 
Just as before the State insists that swimming should be segregated, this time on 
public health grounds, and if there is only one pool it should be available only to the 
majority group; the non-red-haired. Again, as before, you as Mayor, do not have the 
resources to build a second pool.
Now it seems to me that it could be a perfectly reasonable decision of the 
people as a whole to close down the pool, to express solidarity. But it also seems that 
the case in justice for doing so is very weak indeed; almost to the point of vanishing 
altogether. In this clash between Pareto-optimality and fairness, optimality seems the 
clear winner in this case. But superficially the two cases look very similar. How can 
we make the distinction between cases?
The answer will, of course, be obvious. The black/white case is a racist policy, 
based on a standing pattern of discrimination against a group which is already worse 
off. The red hair case does not have these features. One feels much more prepared to 
ensure that no-one is relatively disadvantaged by deliberately unjust treatment than 
to ensure that no one is relatively disadvantaged by public health policy which turns 
out to be uneven in its effects. Is it, then, that in one case we feel entitled to stand up 
to the malice of the rulers, whereas in the other there is no malice present?
But this is not quite right. Suppose, to adjust the example somewhat, the racist 
policy is a legacy of past legislation that no one believes in but no one has bothered 
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to repeal. Thus although there may be negligence, there is no malice. But this hardly 
seems to make a difference to the acceptability of levelling down. Why, then, does 
one inequality, related to skin colour, matter so much when another, related to hair 
colour, matters much less, when the inequalities are, in some sense, the same?
To use an argument from Ann Phillips it is not true that the inequalities that 
matter most are the ones that are most unfair in themselves. Rather, certain 
inequalities have a further symbolic meaning or function and can express an explicit 
or implicit ranking of citizens into groups of different worth. (Phillips 1999) To adapt 
one of Phillips' examples, it would not normally matter very much if eye surgeons 
happened to be paid less than equally trained, skilled and dedicated ear surgeons. 
But if eye surgery happened to be a job performed mostly by women or by members 
of a minority and ear surgery by white men, then things look very different. Purely 
contingent unfairness is much easier to accept than a systematic pattern which is to 
the disadvantage of a previously disadvantaged group. What we see here is a type of 
intersection between political equality and economic equality. Sometimes it seems 
right to level down in economic, or, at least, well-being, terms, in order to achieve 
political equality, or, at least, to remove clear barriers to political equality.
Now, with these reasons on display we have to revisit the question of whether 
this is well-represented as a case of levelling down after all. Three positions appear 
possible:
a) Yes - this is a genuine case of levelling down.
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b) No - this is a case where the worst off are made better off in an already well-
understood sense.
c) No - this is a case where the worst off are made better off in a subtle new category 
of well-being.
If one treats the real-Pareto maxim as axiomatic it is necessary to attempt to 
defend (b) or (c). Suppose, though, on the basis of further reflection (a topic for a 
further occasion) we conclude (a). Sometimes, then, we should level down. But I 
have only suggested that this is relevant when there are symbolic factors at play, 
which send messages of deep political inequality. This is not the politics of envy, or a 
cancer that will spread to allow all sorts of levelling down. Thus I would 
provisionally conclude that levelling down can be reasonable in a very special sort of 
case. Those sympathetic to equality should not be ashamed of this.7
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